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Public procurement financial thresholds in the EU and their
relationship with the GPA
Dr. Pedro Telles1
Abstract
The regulation of procurement within the European Union is binary: above
certain  financial  thresholds,  contracts  are  subject  to  full  EU  regulation,
whereas  below  they  are  only  subject  to  national  rules  (in  general).  First
introduced in the 1970s, the financial thresholds are arbitrary without a clear
justification  for  their  specific  values.  Thresholds  remained  fairly  stable  in
nominal  terms  and  over  the  years  became  solely  dependent  on  the
commitments assumed in the various revisions of multilateral procurement
agreements, currently the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 2014.
In consequence, the external market access commitments accepted by the
EU  in  the  GPA  determine  today  the  size  of  public  procurement  internal
market. 
While it is true that inflation and currency fluctuations have progressively
reduced the real term value of thresholds, no proactive reductions have been
undertaken by EU lawmakers, contrary to what was done with trade tariffs. In
consequence,  current  threshold  levels  do  not  reflect  any  productivity
improvements  or  transaction  cost  reductions  achieved during  the  last  40
years.  By remaining stable in nominal  and changing only due to external
pressures and inflation inertia, the thresholds have effectively functioned as
a ceiling and a floor to the concept of internal market in public procurement
within the EU. 
1. Introduction
General  financial  thresholds  have  been  part  of  European  public
procurement regulation since the early 1970s. These thresholds determine
what  contracts  are  covered  or  not  by  the  various  rounds  of  Directives
applicable to public procurement. In consequence, it can be argued that the
adoption of these general financial thresholds has a binary effect, splitting
public contracts into those fully subject to EU law and those which are not.
As such, today contracts valued above financial thresholds are automatically
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part of the EU internal market,2 whereas the ones below-thresholds are not.
Contracts  below-thresholds are subject,  in  general,  only  to national  rules.
They may, however, be subject to EU primary law, that is the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union principles and rules3 in case they have
cross-border  interest.4 Even  with  cross-border  interest,  these  lower  value
contracts are not subject to EU secondary law, that is the various iterations
of public procurement Directives. During the period analysed in this paper
(1970s  -  2015)  EU  substantive  rules  applicable  to  public  procurement
changed  substantially,  growing  in  scope  and  detail  with  each  iteration.
Financial thresholds, however, remained fairly stable over the years bar a
couple of alterations. Today, they are accepted as “received wisdom” and
their  existence  never  questioned.  The  traditional  view  of  why we  have
financial  thresholds  at  all  in  the  EU,  how they came about  and the  why
behind their value has not been entirely established.
The binary division afforded by the threshold system is based upon the
implicit assumption that only contracts above certain financial count towards
the internal market and thus, are worthy of EU regulation under the form of
harmonization Directives.5 The arguments justifying the threshold system are
2 Due to the way that the EU and Member States divide and share competencies, European
public  procurement  rules  are  based  on  the  objective  of  achieving  an  internal  market,
common to the 28 Member States The aim of the internal market is to integrate the Member
States’ national markets into a single European market.. On this topic please see, for all,
Kaczorowska, European Union Law, 3rd edition 2014, p. 477 – 602; Craig and De Burca, EU
Law:  Text,  Cases  and  Materials,  6th edition  2015,  p.  607-637;  Kamiel  Mortelmans,  The
Common Market, the Internal Market and the Single Market, What’s in a Market?, 35 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 101 (1998);
3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 34, 49, 55 and 56. On this topic 
see, D Dragos and R Vornicu, Public Procurement Below Thresholds in the European Union: 
EU Law Principles and National Responses, European Procurement & Public-Private 
Partnership Law Review, 10, 3 (2015) p.187 -206.
4 See generally Consolidated Version  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European
Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TFEU]. Since the Telaustria case in 2000
(Case C-324/98  Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria AG
ECLI:EU:C:2000:669. However, the definition of what constitutes “cross-border interest” has
fluctuated over the years and is yet to be settled. Even the most recent decisions by the
CJEU from 2012-2015, although referring to concessions where the cross-border issue is also
relevant, have fluctuated between various degrees of certainty for what constitutes cross-
border  interest:  C-338/12  Comune di  Ancona v  Regione Marche  ECLI:EU:C2013:535;  C-
221/12 Belgacom NV v INTEGAN ECLI:EU:C:2013:736; C-113/13, Spezzino Azienda sanitaria
locale  n.5  “Spezzino”  and  Others,  EU:C:2014:2240 and  C-278/14  Enterprise  Focused
Solutions SRL v Spitalul Judetean de Urgenta Alba Iulia ECLI:EU:C2015:228. The conflicting
case law highlights the difficulties raised by the cross-border interest test.
5 On  the  objectives  of  EU  regulation  in  public  procurement,  see  Sue  Arrowsmith,  The
Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives: Ends, Means and the Implications for National
Regulatory  Space  for  Commercial  and  Horizontal  Procurement  Policies,  in 14  CAMBRIDGE
YEARBOOK EUR. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 1-47 (2012)
two-fold:  first,  EU rules  impose  an  administrative  cost  due to  the  formal
tendering rules they prescribe;6 second, compliance and transaction costs on
contracting authorities and suppliers, therefore they should be limited only to
the contracts which are more likely to generate competition from suppliers
based in other Member States.7 
This  paper  will  be  focused  only  on  the  general  financial  thresholds
applicable to works, services and supplies contracts, currently regulated by
Directive 2014/24/EU. It  will  leave aside thresholds applicable to all  other
contracts  governed  by  EU  law  such  as  the  ones  applicable  to  utilities,8
concessions,9 defence,10 “Part  B  services”,11 or  the  new  social  and  other
services  contracts.12 It  will  show  first  that  financial  threshold  values  are
arbitrary and have no substantive reason for their specific levels today other
than  the  compromise  between  the  different  interests  of  EU  integration,
international  agreements  such  as  the  1981  Tokyo  Code,  the  1994
Government Procurement Agreement and the protection of national interests
and  industries.  Furthermore,  this  paper  will  highlight  that  they  have
remained reasonably stable in nominal terms over the years and that the
only changes in real terms were essentially brought by inflation. Finally, this
paper  will  also  raise  the  discussion  that  the  justifications  for  the  current
threshold system and values no longer hold true and that the 2014 reform
missed the opportunity to significantly revise the thresholds and completely
ignored the digital economy. Directive 2014/24/EU however, finally contains a
revision clause for threshold values which implying their reconsideration in
accordance  with  levels  of  cross-border  procurement,  SME  participation,
transaction costs, cost-benefit trade-offs and inflation.13 The Directive implies
that the future revision should be upwards, a position this author contests
and  that  goes  against  the  text  of  the  revised  Government  Procurement
Agreement from 2012. 
This paper is divided into four main sections, covering different historical
6 Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement - Regulation in the EU and UK,
Volume 1, 3rd Edition, 2014 p, 448. Although perhaps it would have been preferable to divide
the costs into transaction and opportunity costs.
7 ibid, p. 448. As will be demonstrated in section 4 below, these arguments have been used
over the years to justify the threshold levels.
8 Regulated today by Directive 2014/25/EU.
9 As regulated today by Directive 2014/23/EU.
10 Regulated by Directive 2009/81/EC.
11 As they were regulated in Directive 2004/18/EC.
12 Regulated in Directive 2014/24/EU, Article 74 - 77.
13 Article 92 and Recital 134 of Directive 2014/24/EU.
periods. The first covers the period 1971 – 1993, coinciding with the creation
of the thresholds and the progressive extension of European rules to different
contract  types:  works  (1971),  supplies  (1979)  and  services  (1992).  The
second sections focus on the period between 1993 and 1999, covering the
accession  to  the  1994  GPA  agreement  and  ending  before  the  euro’s
adoption. The third section goes from 1999 to 2014, covering the euro years.
The final section is focused on today and the near future, particularly the
implications  from  the  threshold  revision  clause  introduced  by  Directive
2014/24/EU.
2.  Financial  threshold’s  evolution  1971  -  1993:  From  Units  of
Account, to European Units of Account (EUA) to European Currency
Units (ECU)
The  history  of  the  financial  thresholds  applicable  in  European  public
procurement can be traced through the different measuring units used for
their calculation. In the early 1970s, the thresholds were calculated based on
a unit of account. This unit of account was known also as the “gold standard
unit  of  account” and was based in  the gold standard abolished after  the
Smithsonian  Agreement  signed  by  the  G1014 in  December  1971  and
subsequent  financial  instability.15 The  “European  Unit  of  Account”  (EUA)
replaced the unit of account in the European Economic Community in 1975.16
The EUA was based on a sum of 9 different European currencies at fixed
rates.17 Its value changed daily in accordance with market fluctuations of the
participating  currencies  and  was  established  daily  by  the  European
Commission using daily market  exchange rates.18 The EUA, however,  was
short lived and in 1979 it was replaced at parity by the European Currency
Unit  (ECU),  which  in  conjunction  with  the  European  Exchange  Rate
Mechanism aimed to reduce the currency fluctuations within the European
Economic  Community.19 The  ECU  value  -  as  the  EUA  before  it  -  was
determined  by  a  weighted  average  of  its  participating  currencies,  which
14 Composed by Belgium, Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
15 European Commission, European Union Public Finance, 4th Edition 2008, p. 198.
16 Decision 75/250/EEC 
17 Decision 75/250/EEC, Article 1.
18 Decision 75/250/EEC, Article 2.
19 Both introduced in the Brussels Council Meeting of December 1978, Resolution of the
European Council  of  5  December 1978 on  the  establishment  of  the  European Monetary
System (EMS) and related matters. 
varied between 1979 and 1999, with the weighting changing in 1984 and
1989 as the currencies for Greece, Spain,  Portugal and Luxembourg were
added. In 1999 the ECU was replaced by the Euro, again at parity. The Euro,
in addition to being the single currency today for 19 Member States is also
the currency currently used within the European Union for the determination
of  financial  values  including  calculating  financial  thresholds  in  public
procurement.
2.1 Financial thresholds in public procurement: works
The first instance of thresholds applicable to public procurement rules is
to  be  found  in  Directive  71/305/EEC.  This  Directive  established  the  first
public  procurement  legal  regime creating positive  obligations  for  Member
States  of  the  then  European  Economic  Community,  covering  exclusively
public works and demanding that such contracts had to have a pecuniary
consideration.20 Article  7  of  Directive  71/305/EEC  stated  that  the  rules
contained therein would only  be applicable  to  contracts  above 1,000,000
units of account. Recital 15 of this Directive, however, established that “the
Commission will at a later date submit to the Council a new proposal for a
Directive  whose  aim is  to  lower  the  threshold  for  the  application  of  co-
ordination  measures  to  public  works  contracts.”  As  we  shall  see,  this
reduction in thresholds never happened.
Directive  71/305/EEC  was  amended  in  1978  by  Directive  78/669/EEC
replacing the 1,000,000 units of account threshold with EUA 1,000,000, thus
maintaining parity but leaving Recital 15 of Directive 71/305/EEC unfulfilled.
The  threshold  was  revised  upwards  in  the  late  1980s  when  Directive
89/440/EEC raised the thresholds to ECU 5,000,000.21 According to Recital 17
of  Directive  89/440/EEC,  the  change was  due to  “the  rise  in  the  cost  of
construction  work  and  the  interest  of  small  and  medium-sized  firms  in
bidding  for  medium-sized  contracts”.  The  consequence  of  raising  the
threshold five-fold was a significant reduction in the scope of the EU internal
20 This  Directive was preceded by the Liberalisation Directives 70/32 and 71/304 which
aimed at eliminating restrictions and discriminatory measures against tenderers from other
Member  States  but  without  being  particularly  successful.  The  Liberalisation  Directives
followed from the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide
services (JO 2/32, English special edition, Series II, Vol IX) and the General Programme for
the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment (JO 2/36, English special edition,
Series II, Vol IX). These General Programmes represented the first foray of the Commission
on the regulation of public procurement. On these, see Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU,
2nd edition, p. 27-30. 
21 Directive 89/440/EEC Article 6.
market  for  works  contracts.  From  July  1990  onwards,22 contracts  valued
between 1,000,000 and 5,000,000 ECU were subject to national rules only.23
The increase introduced by Directive 89/440/EEC remains to this day the only
significant increase in threshold levels in EU public procurement law.24
Neither the Recital nor the main body of Directive 89/440/EC provided any
further  explanations  for  what  effectively  amounted  to  be  a  significant
restriction in the scope of application of EEC rules to public procurement.
Additionally, it can be argued that Recital 17 of Directive 89/440/EEC was in
direct contradiction with Recital 18 as the latter stated that “it is necessary
to  improve  the  access  of  contractors  to  procedures  for  the  award  of
contracts;” thus begging the question of how it would be achieved for the
now excluded contracts  between ECU 1,000,000 and 5,000,000.  This  line
argument is furthered by the admission by the European Commission in 1985
that  to  complete  the  EEC  internal  market,  the  various  procurement
thresholds need to be lower.25 Furthermore, as Directive 89/440/EEC did not
repeal Directive 71/305, but simply amended it, Recital 15 and its promise of
lower thresholds remained in place, although void of any useful effect.
Barring  currency  swings,  the  five-fold  increase  introduced  by Directive
89/440/EEC is the only instance where the general procurement thresholds
were revised upwards since their introduction in the 1970s. It is worth noting
that  these thresholds  went  significantly  up in  a  sector  not  covered  by  a
multilateral agreement and allegedly to protect SMEs from that sector. This
leads to the question (as below with supplies contracts) of how furthering the
public  procurement  internal  market  can  be  achieved  by  means  of  an
exogenous factor like multilateral agreements instead of endogenous ones
such as interest by EEC/EU bodies or the Member States.
Irrespective  of  the  wording  in  Recital  17  of  Directive  89/440/EEC,  the
increase is probably due to policy/political pressure from Member States to
protect their national markets or perhaps an anticipation of the inclusion of
public works in the future multilateral trade agreement. To the author these
two possibilities taken together appear to be a leading explanation for the
increase  as  works  contracts  were  not  part  of  the  Tokyo  Agreement  on
22 The deadline for the Directive to be transposed by Member States was one year from the
date of publication (July 18th, 1989), Directive 89/440/EEC Article 3.
23 Although, as argued above in footnote 4 above, the Court of Justice moved over the
years to subject some of those below-threshold contracts to EU primary law only.
24 However, it will be shown in section 2.2 below that the Directive 88/295/EEC, applicable
to supplies contracts, introduced an increase from EUA 140,000 to ECU 200,000 for some
contracts tendered by specific contracting authorities. 
25 Commission, Completing the internal market COM(85) 310 final, para 85 p.24.
Government Procurement, as they were added only in the 1994 Government
Procurement Agreement (1994 GPA). Furthermore, the European Community
commitment for works contracts under the 1994 GPA was precisely at the
ECU/SDR 5,000,000 mark. Therefore, from 1994 onwards the exposure of a
national works market at the ECU/SR 1,000,000 would be significantly larger
as any GPA signatory party with a similar commitment would benefit from
reciprocity in market access. 
Other arguments or explanations such as exchange rates fluctuations or
inflation can be explored and put to the side. First, the increase was certainly
not due to exchange rate pressures as the ECU did not fluctuate significantly
against the dollar.26 Another explanation for the increase may be found in
inflation figures. Using the French Consumer Price Index or the UK Consumer
Price Index to calculate inflation between March 1979 and July 1989 yields
only a 2x price increase.27 As such, the difference between the inflation and
the actual 5x increase can only be attributed to other factors. In addition,
had the increase been due to inflation it would be the only instance between
1971 and 2015 that any threshold for works, supplies or services contracts
increased due to inflation. Finally, there was no mention of inflation as an
explanation for the increase in Directive 89/440/EEC itself.
Whatever  the  reasons,  it  is  safe  to  argue  that  they  were  not  (direct)
economic  reasons  and were  based on other  objectives  be  them political,
national or a compromise between Member States. The Commission argued
in its 1985 paper on the completion of the internal market that contracting
authorities had a tendency “to keep their  purchases and contracts within
their own country.”28 Raising the thresholds and thus restricting the number
of contracts covered by Directive 71/305 is a sure way to avoid having to
apply any European rules whatsoever and ensuring a higher probability that
the affected contracts would be won by national suppliers.
2.2 Financial thresholds in public procurement: supplies 
26 The ECU devalued around 20% against the USD (the other main SDR basked component)
between March 13th, 1979 and July 18th, 1989. Having said that, the ECU between 1984 and
1985 did indeed drop significantly against the dollar, but most of the fall had been recovered
by  early  1987,  http://fxtop.com/en/currency-converter-past.php?
A=1&C1=USD&C2=XEU&DD=13&MM=03&YYYY=1979&B=1&P=&I=1&btnOK=Go%21,
accessed April 10th, 2015
27http://fxtop.com/en/inflation-calculator.php?
A=100&C1=GBP&INDICE=UKCPI2005&DD1=13&MM1=03&YYYY1=1979&DD2=18&MM2=0
7&YYYY2=1989&btnOK=Compute+actual+value, accessed May 26th, 2015.
28 Commission, Completing the internal market COM(85) 310 final, para 81 p.23.
Financial thresholds for the public procurement of goods (supplies) first
appeared in the 1970s in Directive 77/62/EEC. Article 5(1)(a)(b) defined that
Directive  77/62/EEC  was  applicable  to  contracts  with  a  value  over  EUA
200,000. Article 1(a) of this Directive also referred to the need for “pecuniary
consideration” in the definition of public supply contract. In 1980 Articles 2
and 3 of Directive 80/767/EEC amended Directive 77/62/EEC, reducing the
threshold levels to EUA 140,000 for some supplies contracts, though not all.29
This change was due to the adhesion to the 1979 Tokyo Code Agreement on
Government Procurement,30 which  came into force in 198131 and included
limited  provisions  to  subject  only  part  of  procurement  to  international
competition.32 More importantly, the Code was only applicable to contracts
valued  at  above  SDR  150,000,33 leaving  out  any  contracts  with  a  lower
value.34 
The  change  introduced  by  Directive  80/767/EEC  constitutes  the  first
instance where thresholds were changed due to trade agreement compliance
requirements. First, the Directive recognised in its preamble that the changes
were  due  to  the  1981  Code  and  conceded  the  Commission  powers  to
periodically review the threshold levels in accordance with Article I (1) (b) of
the Code.35 Second, the agreement covered only the contracting authorities
specifically included in a list of participating authorities. Third, on its original
29 This reduction was applicable only to purchase contracts (Article 2, first sub-paragraph)
and some contracts in the sector of defence (Article 2, second sub-paragraph).
30 Decision 80/271/EEC. For a full  analysis of the evolution of international procurement
negotiations,  please  see  Marceau  and  Blank,  History  of  the  government  procurement
negotiations since 1945, Public Procurement Law Review 4 1996, p. 77 – 147.
31 To which the European Economic Community was party, thus representing the then 10
Member States - Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands and United Kingdom. Portugal and Spain acceded later. 
32 On  this  topic  please  see,  Hoekman  and  Mavroidis,  The  World  Trade  Organisation’s
Agreement on Government Procurement -  Expanding Disciplines,  Declining Membership?,
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 1995.
33 Article I (1)(b).
34 The Code included a footnote in Article I stating that “[f]or contracts below the threshold,
the Parties shall consider, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article IX, the application in
whole or part of this Agreement. In particular, they shall review the procurement practices
and procedures utilised and the application of non-discrimination and transparency for such
contracts in connection with the possible inclusion of contracts below the threshold in this
agreement.” Thus indicating that, the parties had an obligation (“shall”) of looking into the
possibility of extending some of the obligations into contracts with a value below-thresholds.
At the very least this footnote, and Article IX (6) when read together with it, indicated an
interest in periodically deepening the achievements by applying these principles to lower
valued contracts and to periodically revise the Agreement.
35 Directive 80/767/EEC Article 3.
version,  only  the  procurement  of  goods  was  covered,  leaving  out  both
services  and  works.36 Fourth,  it  has  been  argued  that  in  the  1980s,  the
revisions  introduced  to  the  EEC rules  in  public  procurement  were  mostly
driven by the need to adapt them to the 1981 Code.37
Directive 88/295/EEC introduced some significant changes to the regime
of Directive 77/62/EEC as amended by Directive 80/767/EEC. First, references
to  EUA  were  replaced  with  ECU  in  Article  5(1)(a).  Second,  two  clear
thresholds were established: ECU 200,000 and 130,000. The higher threshold
was applicable only to the contracting authorities mentioned in Article 1(b) of
the Directive,38 which were not covered by the revised Code Agreement on
Government Procurement. These authorities roughly correspond to what we
call today sub-central contracting authorities. 
The lower threshold of  ECU 130,000 was applicable  to the contracting
authorities referred to in Annex I to the Directive. This list is identical to the
one provided by the revised Code Agreement on Government Procurement,
which  came  into  force  also  in  1988.  The  revision  of  the  code  is  not
particularly  significant  except  for  the  fact  that  the  threshold  value  was
reduced from SDR 150,000 to SDR 130,000 for the entities included in the
scope of Article I (1)(b) of the Agreement.39 
 The  division  between  contracting  authorities  subject  to  different
threshold  levels  according  to  their  coverage  status  under  the  Code
Agreement on Public Procurement indicates the importance of the external
commitments undertaken by the EEC in determining the scope of the internal
market for public procurement. In consequence, it can be argued that the
engine  of  public  procurement  single  market  integration  is  an  external
multilateral agreement and not the internal pressure coming from either the
EEC institutions or the Member States.
 The segregation between central and sub-central contracting authorities
introduced  by  Directive  88/295/EEC  constitutes  first  instance  where  the
general thresholds depended on the nature of the contracting authority, as in
Directive 80/767/EEC the 200,000/140,000 threshold depended on the nature
of  the  contract  instead.  The  segregation  based  on  contracting  authority
nature  remains  to  this  day  and  is  still  present  in  the  current  Directive
36 Except services essential to the procurement of those goods.
37 Fernandez Martin, (1996) The EC Public Procurement Rules, p.16 
38 State, regional or local authorities, bodies governed by public law, associations formed
by one or several of such authorities or bodies governed by public law.
39 The  footnote  remained  in  place  as  well.  Text  of  the  agreement  available:
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_rev_text_1988_e.pdf,  accessed April  10th,
2015.
2014/24/EU. It is interesting to note however, that while law makers decided
to treat differently sub-central contracting authorities when it came down to
supplies contracts, the same logic was never applied in works contracts. To
this day there is only a single threshold for works contracts, irrespective of
the central or sub-central nature of the contracting authority, whereas for
goods and services the distinction and differing thresholds remains.
The  final  main  change  introduced  by  Directive  88/295/EEC  in  what
concerns thresholds was the periodical revision mechanism,40 which remains
in place to this day albeit with alterations. This provision established that
thresholds should be revised every two years from 1988 by calculating the
average daily values of national currencies in ECU and then of the ECU in
SDR  over  (more  or  less)  that  two-year  period.  The  revision  mechanism
provides  us  with  another  clue  about  the  importance  of  the  multilateral
agreement commitments entered into by the EEC as the only reason for the
revisions is simply the volatility of the ECU/SDR exchange rate. As argued in
the works section above, inflation is neither cited as a reason to revise the
thresholds, nor included in the revision mechanism.
Directive  77/62/EEC  was  finally  repealed  and  replaced  by  Directive
93/36/EEC which did not introduce major changes to the thresholds.
2.3 Financial thresholds in public procurement: services 
Services  in  themselves  were  only  regulated  by  a  public  procurement
Directive in 1992 with Directive 92/50/EEC.41 Before this Directive, services
were not subject to secondary legislation at European level. 
Article 7 of Directive 92/50/EEC established an ECU 200,000 threshold and
expressly referred to the need of contracts having a  “pecuniary interest”,42
instead  of  pecuniary  consideration  as  in  Directives  71/305/EEC  and
77/62/EEC.  The  new reference  to  pecuniary  interest  was  carried  over  to
Directives  93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC and is  an important  element  for  the
operation  of  the  threshold  system  as  without  attributing  a  value  it  is
impossible to analyse if contracts are above or below the thresholds. 
2.4 Inflation impact on thresholds from 1979 to 1993
40 Article 5(1)(c) Directive 88/295/EEC.
41 On this Directive please see Trepte, Extension of the EC procurement regime to public
services contracts: an overview of the Services Directive, PPLR (2) 1993 p.1- 12
42 Article 1(a).
By  1993  the  EU  had  a  complete  public  procurement  system covering
works, goods/supplies and service contracts. Each contract type had finally a
threshold level which was reasonably stable and subject to correction only
every two years in accordance with exchange fluctuations.
The 1980s was a period of high inflation, certainly higher than recently,
and  using  the  French  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI)  as  a  benchmark  it  is
possible  to  measure  the  effects  of  inflation  in  the  public  procurement
thresholds. As the conversions between European Units of Account and ECU
were done at parity,43 it is possible to have an idea of the impact inflation
had on the thresholds between 1979 and 1993. 1979 is used as a starting
date for the calculation since that is the year when supplies were subject to
thresholds and the Unit of Account had just been replaced with the EUA in
1978.
1979 1993 nominal
values
1993 real or
inflation
adjusted
values
Inflation
adjusted
difference
between 1978
and 1993
Works 1,000,000 5,000,000 2,900,000 172%
Supplies (not
covered by
Revised Tokyo
Agreement)
200,000 200,000 116,000 58%
Supplies
(Covered by
Revised Tokyo
Agreement)
200,000 130,000 75,000 37%
Services - 200,000 200,000 -
Table 1 – Inflation effects on thresholds between March, 1979 and January,
1993. Data computed using French Consumer Price Index which yielded a
2.4x inflation rate between those dates. All values in EUA and ECU.
Between 1979 and 1993 the French CPI index rose 2.4x,44 contributing to
43 The author was unable to confirm if the conversion of the Units of Account into European
Units of Account was done at parity.
44http://fxtop.com/en/inflation-calculator.php?
A=100&C1=GBP&INDICE=UKCPI2005&DD1=13&MM1=03&YYYY1=1979&DD2=18&MM2=0
7&YYYY2=1989&btnOK=Compute+actual+value, accessed June 2nd, 2015.
erode significantly in real terms the thresholds of supplies. As argued above
when looking at the 1978-1988 period, for works the nominal increase was
higher than inflation, its real value was not eroded at all. In fact, in 1993 it
was  2.9  times  higher  than originally,  contributing  as  argued above  for  a
contraction of the scope of the public procurement internal market.
3.  Financial  threshold’s  evolution  1993  -  1999:  Uniformisation
with the GPA
During the negotiations for the GATT Uruguay Round, procurement was
back in  the agenda and a new Government Procurement Agreement was
agreed in Marrakech in 1994.45 This new GPA entered into force in 1996 and
expanded the coverage from supplies and ancillary services to include works
and services as well.46 
The 1994 GPA does not establish the thresholds in the main body of the
agreement,  contrary  to  what  happened  in  the  1981  Tokyo  Code  on
Government  Procurement.  They  are  included  on  a  country-by-country
approach  by  each  member  on  Annex  I  and  Annex  II.  In  its  Annex,  the
European Community (EC),47 representing all Member States, established the
following thresholds for its procurement market:
Central  Authorities
(Annex I)
Sub-Central  Authorities
(Annex II)
Works SDR 5,000,000 SDR 5,000,000
Supplies SDR 130,000 SDR 200,000
45 On  this  process  see,  Marceau  and  Blank,  History  of  government  procurement
negotiations  since  1945,  PPLR (1996)  4,  p.  77-147,  Mavroidis  and Hoekman,  The WTOs
Agreement  on  Government  Procurement:  expanding  disciplines,  declining  membership?
PPLR  1995  2  p.  63  -79;  Trepte  The  GATT  GPA  and  the  Community  procurement  rules:
realignment  and  modification,  PPLR  (3)  1995  CS42  -  44  and  Trepte,  The  GPA  and  the
Community procurement rules: update on the legislative process, PPLR 1996 (6) CS159-162.
46 On  this  agreement  see,  Arrowsmith  and  Anderson  (eds),  The  WTO  Regime  on
Government  Procurement,  Cambridge  University  Press,  2011  and  for  a  critical  analysis,
Liang,  Government  Procurement  at  Gatt/WTO:  25 Years  of  Multilateral  Framework.  Asian
Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 277-290.
47 Council Decision 94/800/EC, 22 December 1994.
Services SDR 130,000 SDR 200,000
Table 2: 1994 GPA EC commitments
As  mentioned  in  section  2,  the  works  thresholds  increased  five-fold
between 1979 and 1993 and the value in Directive 93/37/EEC, in force at the
time of approval of the Marrakech agreement, was ECU 5,000,000. In the
same period of time, supplies thresholds were reduced from EUA 200,000 to
ECU 130,000 but  only for  central  contracting authorities,  with sub-central
contracting authorities remaining at ECU 200,000. It has to be too much of a
coincidence that the nominal  thresholds48 would become exactly  identical
both for intra-community and third country access between 1992 and 1994,
when both the Directives and the GPA agreement were being concluded.49 
Arrowsmith mentions that the GPA regulates the relationship between the
EC and  other  signatory  parties,  not  the  internal  relationship  between EC
Member States.50 In strictly theoretical legal terms that is correct, but in face
of the evidence it certainly appears that those external commitments have
shaped  the  size  and  scope  of  the  internal  market,  therefore  indirectly
determining the internal relationship between Member States. There are no
coincidences when European Commission decides in 1995 to standardise all
thresholds at the exact same levels as those of the GPA,51 by making direct
reference  to  SDR  values  instead  of  ECUs.  The  work  of  the  European
Commission paved the way to the adoption of the Directive 97/52/EC which
amended Directives 92/50/EEC, 93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC. In what concerns
thresholds, one of the main changes introduced by Directive 97/52/EC was to
refer to the thresholds in ECU as “SDR-equivalent”, effectively anchoring the
real threshold values to set by the GPA in those three Directives.52 If doubts
48 That is, before fluctuations in the ECU/SDR exchange rates are taken into account.
49 The same finding hold true as well for the Utilities Directive 93/38/CEE 14(1) and Annex
III of the GPA 1994, where the thresholds are SDR/ECU 400,000 (services and goods) and
5,000,000  (works).  Contracts  with  public  telecommunications  networks  are  in  apparent
conflict as the threshold in the Directive was ECU600,000, but they were never included by
European Community in the negotiations and as such are not part of the of the 1994 GPA. In
any case, telecommunications were excluded from the subsequent Directive 2004/17/EC and
are no longer regulated by public procurement. 
50 Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, First Edition 1996, p. 160.
51 Commission, COM (95) 107 Final
52 There is a significant exception to this rule introduced by Directive 97/52/EC. For service
contracts included in Annex IB to Directive 92/50/EC, colloquially known as “Part B services”
which are not covered by the GPA, nor object of this paper. The revised drafting of Directive
92/50/EC  Article  7(1)(a)  states  that  the  threshold  for  these  contracts  is  200,000  ECU,
omitting any reference to “SDR-equivalent” values. Once more, for contracts not covered by
the  multilateral  procurement  agreements  there  appears  to  be  little  appetite  for  further
remained as to where the incentive for Directive 97/52/EC came from, Recital
1 and 3 state clearly the influence of the 1994 GPA in leading to the need to
create this Directive. 
Directive 97/52/EC provides another argument in favour of the line that
the  various  iterations  of  multilateral  agreements  applicable  to  public
procurement drove the changes in the scope of EU public procurement rules.
Recital  5  candidly  admits  that  “certain  provisions  of  the  [Government
Procuremet] Agreement introduce more favourable conditions for tenderers
than those laid down in Directives 92/50/EEC, 93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC”,
with Recital 5 arguing for an equivalence in what concerns opportunities for
access to the contracts covered by the 1992/1993 Directives and the GPA as
well.
The “SDR-equivalent”  approach adopted in Directive 97/52/EC provides
one of the best arguments in favour of the equivalence between the internal
market and external commitment. The fact they are identical reduces the
system’s complexity for practitioners. A single set of thresholds is easier to
apprehend than multiple sets. However, this argument should be taken to its
logical conclusion, that a single threshold is better than the 5 different ones
which existed then and as shown on Table 2.  Furthermore,  as mentioned
earlier those 5 different thresholds are not internally consistent nor follow a
logical structure: whereas for supplies and services, the thresholds vary in
accordance  with  the  nature  of  the  contracting  authority  (central  or  sub-
central), the same does not happen when it comes down to works, as the
threshold is identical for all contracting authorities. In here lies evidence of
three lines of thought that the author considers to be behind the various
thresholds in the 1990s: first, their actual values are intimately connected
with  the  commitments  undertaken  with  the  multilateral  agreements  in
procurement,  particularly  the  1994  GPA;  second,  they  are  a  political
construct built on compromises and are not based on a substantive reason
that  justifies  their  specific  value;  third,  those  compromises  affected  any
possibility of internal consistency among the different thresholds, hence the
multiple thresholds for supplies and services which are dependent on the
nature of the contracting authority and works which do not.
 
4. Financial threshold’s evolution 1999 – 2014: the Euro years 
European regulation and integration.
4.1 Between 1999 and 2004
The Euro was introduced in 1999 and, once more, the conversion from
ECU to Euro was done at parity. As for the public procurement thresholds
these remained unchanged until the reform process for Directives 92/50/EEC,
93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC concluded. These three Directives were replaced
by Directive 2004/18/EC. During the reform process, thresholds were one of
the topics of debate right from the start. 
The European Commission published a Green Paper53 in 1996 to kickstart
the public  procurement reform process.  This  Green Paper stated that the
then current threshold levels of approximately ECU 200,000, ECU 130,000
and ECU 5,000,000 were set in part due to the need to comply with the 1994
GPA agreement.54 The European Commission posited as well  that  “[t]hese
thresholds are defined with a view to ensuring the competitive procurement
rules apply to contracts likely to interest suppliers from other Member States
while allowing administrative and procedure costs on smaller contracts to be
kept  to  a  minimum.”55 This  explanation  for  the  threshold  levels  by  the
European Commission is important in four levels. First, it recognises that at
least some thresholds are set not because of intrinsic reasons but because of
the commitments assumed in the 1994 GPA agreement. For the contracts
covered by the 1994 GPA agreement, the reason for their threshold value is
simply  the commitments  made by the  European Community  and nothing
else.
Second, the European Commission suggested that those threshold levels
ensure  that  contracts  that  are  likely to  interest  suppliers  based  in  other
Member  States  are  available  to  them.  But  the  European  Commission  is
implying another thing here: by linking the possible foreign interest to the
value of the contract,  it  is  doing so not only for suppliers based in other
Member States, but also for those based in GPA signatory parties. The latter,
of course are not part of the European single market, but benefit from access
to it in conditions of reciprocity. The assumption that higher value contracts
imply a higher intrinsic interest was provided without providing any evidence
of  a  correlation  (let  alone  causation)  that  higher  value  contracts  are
53 Commission, Green Paper Public Procurement in the European Union – Exploring the way
forward, COM(96) 583 final.
54 Ibid, p.50.
55 Ibid, p. 50.
intrinsically more interesting for foreign suppliers. That may well be the case,
but it  is  being taken as received wisdom instead of as a consequence of
analysing real data.
Third, the European Commission failed to provide any justification for the
binary approach whereby all contracts above thresholds are subject to the
full might of EU regulation and those below are not.56 What is the reason that
makes contracts above an arbitrary value relevant for the internal market
and as such subject to that EU regulation?
Finally,  the  European  Commission  also  recognised  that  the  threshold
levels provided a cost/benefit balance so that administrative and procedural
costs on smaller contracts can be kept to a minimum. One must not forget
however the historical context of the Green Paper. It was published in 1996
when the internet was still in its infancy and the subsequent reductions in
cross-border trade transaction costs or its effect on improving total factor
productivity were yet to come to pass. In a sense, we can see reflected in the
Green  Paper  the  pre-internet  logic  that  disregarded  its  potential  as  a
communication tool  and a driver  to reduce administrative and procedural
costs  when  e-procurement  is  used.  The  justifications  of  the  European
Commission also predate the simplification work carried out in the 2004 and
the 2014 reforms, particularly the latter.57However, it is interesting to note
that these arguments about transaction costs in small  contracts as a last
resort defence for thresholds remained constant over the last 20 years and
they are present even today in Article 92 of Directive 2014/24/EU as will be
discussed in the final section of this paper.
In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposal for a new
Public  Sector  Directive58 published  in  2000,  the  European  Commission
suggested that the threshold system spread across three different Directives
was  not  “straightforward  or  user-friendly”  and  suggested  that  perhaps  it
would be preferable to have thresholds in Euro accompanied with the powers
for  the Commission to  periodically  review them,59 to  ensure they did not
56 It is important to note that this Green Paper is prior to Telaustria (Case C-324/98) and the
creation by the Court of Justice of the cross-border interest test to define if Treaty principles
are applicable to contracts not covered by the Directives. 
57 Electronic procurement is not mandatory in the EU until 2018. Directive 2014/24/EU, 
Article 90.
58 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public
service  contracts  and  public  works  contracts  COM(2000)  275  final.  In  this  proposal  the
thresholds remained unchanged other than being a fixed euro amount instead of a SDR
indexed value as before.
59 Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposal for a Directive of the European
deviate much from the SDR commitment assumed with the GPA 1994. In
other words, having just moved in 1997 to set the thresholds set in “SDR
equivalent”,  the  European  Commission  probably  concluded  that  forcing
contracting authorities to calculate the thresholds on a case-by-case basis
was more complex than anticipated.60
In  the  subsequent  legislative  drafting  process61 different  suggestions
about  thresholds  were made.  Many suggested an increase in  comparison
with the values proposed by the European Commission at the start of the
legislative  process.  Absent  from  the  discussions  appear  to  be  any
substantive reasons for raising or lowering the thresholds, as well  as any
interest  in  using  inflation  as  a  guiding  element  for  the  suggestions.  For
example,  the  Member  of  the  European  Parliament  (MEP)  Maria  Berger
suggested that the thresholds should roughly double to €250,000 (goods and
services for central authorities), €500,000 (goods and services sub-central
authorities)  and  €10,000,000  (works)  with  the  argument  that  the  then
current threshold levels did not result in “any increase in cross-border trade
in the area of public contracts.”62 This view was echoed by other MEPs such
as Bert Doorn and Toine Manders, who suggested an increase in thresholds
with the justification that the then current thresholds were not offset by the
benefits  and imposed a disproportionate burden on smaller  suppliers  and
authorities.63 Furthermore,  Joachim Wuermeling  suggested  a  more  limited
increase, arguing that it would “take account of the objective of opening the
internal market.”64 It seems strange that the internal market objective would
be better served by raising the thresholds and thus reducing the overall size
of said market as well as hindering the access to the same internal market
for  smaller  suppliers.  The  limited  increase  proposed  by  Wuermeling
(€200,000,  €300,000  and  €7,000,000)  was,  however  taken  up  by  the
Parliament and of  the Council  on the coordination of procedures for the award of public
supply contracts, public service contracts and public works contracts COM(2000) 275 final,
Article 8.
60 Suggesting a return to SDR denominated thresholds, Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and 
Utilities Procurement, Third Edition 2014, p. 450.
61 The legislative process at EU level is always started by the European Commission, but 
the final decision is taken in conjunction between the Council and the European Parliament. 
The 2004 reform followed the old legislative co-decision procedure. With the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, this is now known as the ordinary procedure (Article 294 
TFEU).
62 Hebly,  European  Public  Procurement  -  Legislative  History  of  the  “Classic”  Directive
2004/18/EC, p. 463-464
63 Ibid, p. 464
64 Ibid, p. 466
European Parliament in the first reading.65 The subsequent Council Common
Position  indicated  a  compromise  and  suggested  €162,000,  €249,000  and
€6,242,000.66 These  compromise  threshold  values were  adopted  for  the
original version of Article 7 of the Directive 2004/18/EC. Furthermore, Recital
17  of  Directive  2004/18/EC  stated  that  multiple  thresholds  “complicates
matters”  and  that  establishing  them  in  euro  would  contribute  to  the
simplification of the regime. This Recital also called for the periodic review of
the thresholds to ensure compatibility with the 1994 GPA commitments, with
the  periodic  review  process  for  thresholds  established  in  Article  78  of
Directive 2004/18/EC. This is to be undertaken by the European Commission
every two years and is indexed to the €/SDR average exchange rate over a
period  of  24  months.67 This  constitutes  yet  another  clear  indication  that
threshold levels are simply determined by the 1994 GPA commitments and
do not have a substantive reason to exist directly connected with the EU’s
internal market.
4.2 From 2004 to 2014
The thresholds adopted in the original drafting of Directive 2004/18/EC
Article 7 were higher than the prevailing SDR/EUR exchange rate and as they
were now set directly in EUR and as such subject to fluctuations in exchange
rates.68 Therefore, in accordance with Article 78 of the Directive 2004/18/EC,
the  European  Commission  initiated  in  late  2004  the  first  process  of
periodically reviewing the thresholds every two years to ensure compliance
with the 1994 GPA commitments, following the two-year revision mechanism
included  in  the  GPA  and  adopted  in  the  Directive  2004/18/EC.  The  new
thresholds were published in late 200469 and their value was almost identical
to  the  original  thresholds  set  by  the  European  Commission  for  2004.70
Therefore it can be safely argued that 1994 GPA commitments overruled the
compromise  achieved  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council
during  the  legislative  process  that  led  to  the  approval  of  Directive
2004/18/EC.
65 Ibid, p. 469.
66 Ibid, p 471
67 Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement - Regulation in the EU and UK, 
Volume 1, 3rd Edition, 2014, p. 449.
68 Arguing that  this  was done for  political  reasons,  Arrowsmith,  The Law of  Public  and
Utilities Procurement - Regulation in the EU and UK, Volume 1, 3rd Edition, 2014, p. 450. 
69 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2083/2005.
70 Information 2003/C 309/07 14.
Between 2004 and today, the thresholds have been updated every two
years as requested by Directive 2004/18/EC and the 1994 GPA agreement.
The various alterations between 2004 and 2014 are summarised in Table 3.
2004-
05
original
Directi
ve
2004/1
8/EC
2004-
05
subsequ
ent
2006-07 2008-
09
2010-
11
2012-
13
2014-15
Servic
es and
suppli
es
(centr
al)
154,01
4
162,00
0
154,000 137,000 133,000 125,000 130,00
0
134,000
Servic
es and
suppli
es
(sub-
centra
l)
236,94
5
249,00
0
236,000 211,000 206,000 193,000 200,00
0
207,000
Works 5,923,6
24
6,242,0
00
5,923,0
00
5,278,00
0
5,150,0
00
4,845,0
00
5,000,0
00
5,186,00
0
Table 3– Nominal threshold values from 2004 to 2014. All values in euros.
In  the  period  analysed,  nominal  thresholds  have  remained  relatively
steady. Nominal values between the end of 2004 and 2014 dropped around
13%. This reduction is due to the fluctuations in the  €/SDR exchange rate
only, a finding that can be easily attested by the fact all thresholds dropped
by  the  same  amount  in  percentage  terms. Inflation,  however,  as  had  a
significant erosion effect in the in the decade to 2014, effectively reducing
the thresholds by 29.39% in the same period.71 Combining inflation with the
nominal reduction between 2004 and 2014 leads us to a 34% drop, as can be
seen in table 4.
71 UKCPI data, http://fxtop.com/en/inflation-calculator.php?
A=5923000&C1=GBP&INDICE=UKCPI2005&DD1=01&MM1=01&YYYY1=2005&DD2=31&MM
2=12&YYYY2=2014&btnOK=Compute+actual+value
2004/2005
final values
2014
nominal
values
2014
inflation
adjusted
values
Inflation
between
2004 and
2014
(compounde
d)
Adjusted
difference
between
2004/200
5 and
2014
Works 5,923,000 5,186,000 7,663,000 29.39% 34%
Supplies &
Services
(not covered
by Tokyo
Agreement
or GPA)
236,000 207,000 305,000 29.39% 34%
Supplies &
Services
(covered by
Tokyo
Agreement
or GPA)
154,000 134,000 199,000 29.39% 34%
Table 4 – Inflation effects between March 2004 and December 2014. UKCPI
data used. All values in euros.
4.4 Inflation and currency fluctuation effects between 1979 and
2014 
Having established in tables 2 and 4 the effects of inflation for the 1979-
1993 and 2004-2014 periods, it is relevant to assess the cumulative effect of
inflation in works and supplies thresholds for the 1979 to 2014 period.  
1979 original
values
2014 nominal
values
2014 inflation
adjusted
values
Inflation
adjusted
difference
between 1979
and 2014
Works 1,000,000 5,186,000 3,683,000 162%
Supplies 
(not covered
by Tokyo
Agreement or
GPA)
200,000 207,000 736,000 28%
Supplies
 (covered by
Tokyo
Agreement or
GPA)
200,000 134,000 75,000 18%
Average 466,000 1,842,000 1,498,000 69%
Table 5 – Inflation effects between March 1979 and December 2014. UKCPI
data used and all values in euros. Services contracts were not included in as
they were only regulated in 1992.
The table above provides a good indication of the effects of inflation
over  time.  Comparing  the  thresholds  between  1979  and  2014  yields  a
significant decrease for supplies (not covered by Revised Tokyo Agreement or
GPA) the only threshold that never changed in nominal terms over time: its
real value has been eroded to 28% of the original value. For supplies covered
by the Revised Tokyo Agreement or GPA the erosion is even more substantial
with a reduction to 18% of the original value. The odd one out are works
contracts thresholds, as due to the 1980s increase, their current value is still
significantly higher than the original 1970s threshold.
Table 5 however does not include the effects of exchange fluctuation
as none of the thresholds in 1979 was determined by commitments in the
Tokyo Agreement and as such there was no currency fluctuation related to
SDR,  although both  the EUA and the  ECU were  composed by baskets  of
currencies and as such the thresholds were already back then subject to the
vagaries  of  currency exchanges.  Table 4 should be enough to provide an
indication of the effects produced by the €/SDR exchange rate and as such it
can be argued that at least part of the difference shown in Table 5 is due to
nominal reductions imposed by the commitments of the GPA 1994 and 2012.
The  change  in  threshold  values  shown  in  tables  4  and  5  is  thus
explained (mostly) from inflation and a (partly) from the natural fluctuation of
foreign exchange rates between the units of currency used for the threshold
calculation and SDRs. None of the changes in the 35 year period were due to
a re-thinking of the threshold system or a proactive approach by either the
European Commission or the Member States in furthering the single market
for public procurement. In conclusion, the scope and size of the EU’s public
procurement internal market today is not defined by substantive reasons.
There is no reason why a €125,000 goods contract was subject to the EU
rules  in  2010/11  but  excluded  in  2014/15.72 The  scope  of  the  EU  public
procurement internal  market  depends on two exogenous factors:  the GPA
commitments  and  the  exchange  rate  fluctuations  between  the  euro  and
SDRs. Changes to the size and scope of the market occur passively every
two years.
 As a comparison, it is interesting to highlight what the EU did in terms
of foreign trade in a similar period. Between 1988 and 2010 the EU had no
problem in proactively reducing the average most favoured nation tariff from
8.8% to 2.8%,73 thus meaning the current tariff values are on average today
31% of what they were in the late 1980s. Therefore, whereby the furthering
of the public procurement internal market has happened passively, the EU
has taken proactive steps to improve trade with foreign countries by bringing
tariffs down. 
72 The same argument can be made of intra-EU currency fluctuations, as the
euro is only used as official currency by 19 of the 28 Member States.ß
73 World Bank, Trends in Average MFN Applied Tariff Rates in Developing and Industrial 
Countries, 1981-2010 (Unweighted %), available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/tar2010.xls, 
last accessed June 8th, 2015.
5. Financial thresholds today: a near future revision forced by the
GPA and Directive 2014/24/EU
The GPA was revised recently in 2012,74 entering into force in April 2014.
It  did  not  introduce  any  significant  changes  to  the  headline  threshold
values,75 with the European Union maintaining the same values for Annex I, II
and  III.  However,  Article  XXII(7)  of  the  Revised  GPA  includes  a  provision
stating that the agreement shall be subject to further threshold negotiations
within three years  of  it  coming into  force “with  a  view to  improving this
Agreement, progressively reducing and eliminating discriminatory measures,
and  achieving  the  greatest  possible  extension  of  its  coverage  among all
Parties on the basis of mutual reciprocity, taking into consideration the needs
of  developing  countries.”  [emphasis  by  the  author]  From the  text  of  the
revised  GPA it  appears  that  the  “direction  of  travel”  of  the  thresholds  is
down, as it happened with other trade barriers, including the tariffs imposed
by the EU on goods imported which have been reduced significantly between
1988 and 2010 as mentioned in Section 4. 
Directive  2004/18/EC  was  replaced  by  Directive  2014/24/EU in  2014.76
This  new Directive regulates  thresholds  in  Articles 4 and 92 and in what
concerns the general threshold rules, it has not introduced any significant
changes, although, as with the process leading up to Directive 2004/18/EC
the topic of thresholds was subject to debate.77 In the author’s opinion this
was a wasted opportunity for reviewing the current threshold situation. 
74 On this agreement see, Anderson, The coming into force of the revised WTO Agreement
on Government Procurement,  and related developments,  Public Procurement Law Review
2014  5  NA160-163,  Anderson,  The  conclusion  of  the  renegotiation  of  the  World  Trade
Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement: what it means for the Agreement and
for the world economy, Public Procurement Law Review, 2012, 3 p. 83-94 and Anderson,
Schooner and Swan, The WTO’s revised Government Procurement Agreement – An important
milestone  toward  greater  market  access  and transparency  in  global  public  procurement
markets, The Government Contractor, 2012 1.
75 Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement - Regulation in the EU and 
UK, Volume 1, 3rd Edition, 2014 p, 454.
76 On this Directive in general see, Lichere, Caranta and Treumer (eds): Modernising Public
Procurement: The New Directive (European Procurement Law Series), 2014 and Semple, A
Practical Guide to Public Procurement Law, 2015. The deadline for transposition by Member
States is March 2016, so most are yet to adapt their legal systems to the new Directive. For
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (though not Scotland), the Directive was transposed in
early 2015 via the Public Contracts Regulations 2015. 
77 Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement - Regulation in the EU and
UK, Volume 1, 3rd Edition, 2014 p, 455
Article  6  defines  rules  for  the  calculation  of  thresholds  and a  revision
mechanism similar to what Articles 7 and 78 of Directive 2004/18/EC offered.
Article  92,  goes  further,  however,  by  mandating  mandates  the  European
Commission to review the economic effects on the internal market by 2019,
particularly cross-border procurement and the transaction costs imposed by
the EU legal system in procurement.
Thresholds  are  also  mentioned  in  Recital  18  of  Directive  2014/24/EU
where  once  more  the  relationship  between  them  and  the  GPA  is  made
patently  clear  once more.  Recital  18 it  mentions the need to periodically
review the thresholds to make sure that the GPA obligations are complied
with, similar to what was set in Directive 2004/18/EC. Furthermore, Recital 18
also includes a statement of intent: “[a]n increase in the thresholds set in the
GPA should be explored during the next round of negotiations thereof.” It is
interesting to note that the Directive would include such a remark, albeit in a
Recital,  as it  indicates  what  may be the future evolutions  for  thresholds:
upwards.  This  is  problematic  as  according  to  Article  XXII(7)  of  the  GPA,
renegotiation should occur every three years78 and it would likely imply as
well  an  identical  increase  in  the  intra-EU  thresholds,  something  that  has
already been suggested by authors as a way forward to bring simplicity and
flexibility  into  public  procurement.79 Although  the  possibility  of  having  a
specific regime for very high value contracts with more flexible rules should
not be discarded completely, even bearing in mind the innovations brought
by Directive 2014/24/EU itself, said regime should not come at the expense
of the rest of the internal market. Currently, it is estimated that only 18.5%
of all the procurement spend including contracts below thresholds is covered
by the general thresholds.80 Assuming a power law distribution of contracts,
for  example  doubling  the  thresholds  would  simply  reduce  the  number  of
contracts subject to the bulk of EU law by a much higher margin.81 While it
may make sense to have a principles-based legal regime for the top 1% of
contracts,  as  these  tend  to  be  high  risk  and  one  assumes,  tendered  by
contracting authorities with more capacity and access to advice which would
78 And Recital 134 of Directive 2014/24/EU.
79 With this view, Sue Arrowsmith Modernising the European Union’s Public Procurement
Regime: A Blueprint for Real Simplicity and Flexibility, 21 Public Procurement Law Review,
2012 p.71-73 and Rosemary Boyle, EU Procurement Green Paper on the Modernisation of EU
Public Procurement Policy: A Personal Response, 20 Public Procurement Law Review, 2011,
NA171-181.
80 Commission, (2014) Public Procurement Indicators 2012, p. 10. Utilities, however were
excluded from the calculation, so the overall percentage is actually higher than 18.5%.
81 “In fact, the 1% of the largest notices accounted for more than 50% of the total value
published in TED in 2012 and in all years between 2009 and 2012.” Ibid, p. 4 and 5
indeed benefit from the increased flexibility, it does not hold that we should
restrict the internal  market to that same 1% of contracts. In the author’s
opinion,  an  “internal  market”  composed  of  1%  of  all  public  contracts
tendered in the EU makes a mockery of such concept. Covering 1% of public
procurement  contracts  does  not  an  “internal  market”  make.  The
consequence would be to leave all other contracts subject simply to national
rules  and  the  difficulties  of  establishing  what  constitutes  “cross-border
interest”.82 How easy would then be for micro and small companies which
compose 98.7%83 of all companies in the EU to win contracts that are not
transparent or subject to equal treatment and non-discrimination? 
The fears exposed above are strengthened by Recital  134 of  Directive
2014/24/EU.  This  Recital  builds  upon Article  92 and the  obligation  of  the
European Commission to review the effects on the internal  market of the
thresholds and to take into account facts such as the level of cross-border
procurement, SME participation, transaction costs, the cost-benefit trade-off
and  inflation.  These  are  all  reasons  one  would  expect  would  justify  the
definition  of  what  contracts  should  be  included  or  not  by  default  in  the
internal market for the purposes of applying the full EU public procurement
rules,  and the  author  welcomes this  recent  desire  in  making the  system
dependant  in  endogenous  instead  of  exogenous  factors.  However,  those
reasons appear almost as theoretical in face of the detailed argumentation in
the  second  paragraph  of  the  same  Recital,  where  it  is  stated  that  the
thresholds should be examined in the near future as per. As we have seen
above, the GPA article appears to imply that the thresholds should go down.
Looking  at  Recital  134,  however,  it  seems  the  objective  is  different:  the
thresholds should be revised accordance with inflation thus implying they
should go up in the near future and not down. It is interesting to note that
looking at Table 4, inflation has had a limited effect over the last decade and
that is even before one takes into account other factors which Recital 134
forgets to mention. For example, productivity advances are not mentioned.
What  has  been  the  impact  of  multi  factor  productivity  (MTF)84 in  public
82 On this issue of the difficulties of establishing cross-border interest with certainty, see
Pedro Telles, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, Public Contract Law Journal, 43 (2013) p3-26
and Piotr Bogdanowicz, (Still) Qualitative Approach to a Cross-Border Interest and Application
European  Union  Law  to  Concessions?  Some  Remarks  on  C-388/12  Comune  di  Ancona
Judgment, 2015 24 PPLR p. NA22-27. 
83 Commission,  (2014)  A  Recovery  in  the  Horizon  –  Annual  Report  on  European  SMEs
2012/2013, p.10. Micro and small enterprises are those with less than 50 employees, €10
million yearly turnover and €10 million total balance sheet, ibid. p. 9.
84 On  multi  factor  productivity  or  total  factor  productivity,  see  Hulten,  Total  Factor
Productivity  –  A Short  Biography,  in  New Developments  in  Productivity  Analysis,  Hulten,
procurement over the years for example? Potential improvements harnessed
by the deployment of e-procurement could also play a factor (and yield MTF
advances similar to the ones registered in the decade between 1995 and
2005 in the USA.85 Recital  134 also steers clear from the most important
question  of  them all:  what  kind  of  internal  market  do  we want  in  public
procurement?  With  the  current  threshold  levels,  even  if  eroded  due  to
inflation  and  exchange  fluctuations,  only  around  20%  of  the  whole
procurement spend is covered by EU procurement rules, so do we want an
exclusive or inclusive internal market? Raising the thresholds would lead to
an exclusive internal market and this author remains firmly in the camp that
the public procurement internal market should be inclusive instead.86
 Having said all that Article 92, more so than Recital 134, does give some
hope that in the future the threshold levels will be determined by intrinsic
elements defined by the concept of internal market the EU wants to have
instead of the commitments done in the GPA.
6. Conclusion
This  article  showed  that  from  the  introduction  of  the  first  financial
thresholds in public procurement during the 1970s until today, their nominal
value did not  change significantly,  except  for  the works contracts,  whose
thresholds  were  increased  five-fold  in  the  1980s.  From  the  moment  the
European Economic Community joined the 1981 Tokyo Code on Government
Procurement  and  its  successors  that  the  threshold  levels  for  contracts
covered by these multilateral agreements have remained identical for both
internal and external suppliers. It can thus be said that the size and scope of
the EU’s public procurement internal market is determined by these external
commitments and not intra-EU actions. Since that period there has been no
thorough review or consideration for what would be the most appropriate
level for the thresholds to be set at.
Although  the  threshold  levels  have  remained  stable  for  a  significant
period  of  time,  their  real  value  has  changed.  Inflation  and  currency
Dean  and  Harper  (eds)  2001  and  Syverson,  What  Determines  Productivity?,  Journal  of
Economic Literature 2011, 49:2, p.326-365.
85 Cardarelli and Lusinyan, US Total Factor Productivity Slowdown: Evidence from the U.S.
States, IMF Working Paper (2015) WP/15/116 and Fernald and Ramnath, The acceleration in
U.S.  total  factor  productivity  after  1995:  The  role  of  information  technology,  Economic
Perspectives,  2004Vol 28 (1), p. 53 – 67..
86 Pedro Telles, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, Public Contract Law Journal, 43 (2013) p3-
26.
fluctuations  have  contributed  for  their  progressive  erosion  over  time.
Nonetheless,  even  with  this  erosion  effect,  the  current  thresholds  levels
exclude over 80% of procurement spend from being covered by the EU public
procurement Directives and being part of the internal market. By remaining
stable in nominal and changing only due to external pressures and inflation
inertia, the thresholds have effectively functioned as a ceiling and a floor to
the concept of internal market in public procurement within the EU.
Threshold levels were set in a period before the advent of the internet and
do not take into account increases in productivity, particularly multi factor
productivity that came to pass over the last three decades. Threshold levels
will finally be reviewed in the near future, firstly because Article XXII(7) of the
Revised GPA so determines and secondly,  because Article 92 of  Directive
2014/24/EU also so demands. 
